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Ideology and the Law of the Sea: 
The Challenge of the New International Economic 
Order 
by Boleslaw Adam Boczek* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, the law of the sea has been going through a period 
of transition brought about by rapid technological change, economic pressures, 
and, most importantly, ideological and political challenges from developing 
states. These "Third World" nations have been questioning several fundamental 
rules of traditional internationallaw,l including the legal regime of the oceans, 
which historically has been based on the venerable principle of the freedom of 
the seas.2 This international conflict focusing on the law of the sea is only one 
dimension of much wider confrontation between the affluent industrialized 
nations of the "North" and the less developed, destitute countries of the 
"South."3 The latter demand a radical restructuring of the economic power 
relationship between the two groups of states in the name of the "New lnterna-
* Professor of Political Science, Kent State University. 
I. In particular, Third World nations challenge the traditional doctrine that the norms of customary 
international law are automatically binding on new states. For example, such nations refuse to recognize 
the rule of international law that aliens ought to be treated according to a minimum international 
standard of justice. See, e.g., Roy, Is tM Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal 
International Law?, 55 AM.]. INT'L L. 863 (1961). For an examination of the new states' attitudes toward 
international law see, e.g., R.P. ANAND, NEW STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972);]. SYATAUW, SOME 
NEWLY ESTABLISHED ASIAN STATES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1961); McWhinney, 
The New Countries arut tM "New" International Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. I (1966); L. HENKIN, How 
NATIONS BEHAVE 119-34 (2d ed. 1979). 
2. The principle of the freedom of the seas, a fundamental principle of the law of the sea, became 
universally recognized by the end of the 18th century. Under this principle, no state may validly subject 
any part of the high seas to its sovereignty. It was codified in Article I of the Geneva Convention on the 
High Seas, April 29,1958,13 U.S.T. 2312, T.LA.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, and in Articles 87 and 
89 of the recently signed United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 7 October 1982, U.N. Doc. 
NCONF. 62/122, reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1261, 1286-87 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 
Convention]. For the development of the principle of the freedom of the seas, see I D. O'CONNELL, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 1-20 (LA. Shearer ed. 1982). 
3. This confrontation crystallized with the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD I) in 1964 and continued at subsequent UNCTAD meetings. See generally H.K. 
JACOBSON, NETWORKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE GLOBAL POLITI-
CAL SYSTEM 117-19, 253-55 (1979). 
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tional Economic Order" (NIEO).4 The ideology of the NlEO offers the develop-
ing countries an interpretation of the existing "old" international order, largely 
predicated on the principles of the Western ideology of economic liberalism, and 
rallies them in their struggle for a more equitable new international order. 5 
Because of the currently available and potentially exploitable resources of the 
oceans,6 the law of the sea has become one arena in which the traditional 
Western international order7 is being challenged by the ideology of the NIEO. 
Despite overlapping interests and crisscrossing coalitions, the recently concluded 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS Ill) was the 
central stage upon which these challenges have been most explicitly articulated. 8 
Communist ideology is not presently posing any major challenge to international 
law. Instead the ideology of the NIEO stands against the interests of both the 
United States and the Soviet Union, superpowers which possess virtually identi-
cal concerns in some areas of the law of the sea. 9 
This article discusses whether, and to what extent, the ideological challenges of 
the NIEO have had their impact on the existing and evolving rules of the 
international law of the sea. As the Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 is 
4. The idea of a "New International Economic Order" (NIEO) was a byproduct of the developing 
countries' awareness of their economic inferiority in relation to the developed countries. The N lEO was 
comprehensively articulated in 1974 in the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order, infra note II; Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order, infra note 13; and the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States, infra note 
17. For the historical background of the NIEO, see generally R. MEAGHER, AN INTERNATIONAL REDIS-
TRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND POWER: A STUDY OF THE CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF 
STATES ch. 2 (1979). 
5. The New International Economic Order has been discussed in all its aspects in literally thousands 
of books and articles. For a short English-language bibliography, see Saxena, Select Bibliography on the 
New International Econumu Order, 1960-78, 20 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 125 (1980). 
6. The developing countries are particularly interested in the manganese nodules, containing up to 
fifty percent manganese, with a high content of copper, nickel, cobalt, and other metals, found in large 
numbers on the ocean floor. It is estimated that in the Pacific Ocean alone there are 100-billion to 
1.5-trillion tons of these nodules which accumulate at an estimated annual rate of 10 to 16-million tons. 
Cristol, An International Seabed Authority, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: ISSUES IN OCEAN RESOURCE MANAGE-
MENT, 172, 179 (D. Walsh ed. 1977). For an analysis of the economic value of the manganese nodules 
from the point of view of the developing countries, see D. LEIPZIGER & J. MUDGE, SEABED MINERAL 
RESOURCES AND THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1976). 
7. Traditional Western international order refers to the economic superiority of the West and the 
system of international law developed by older Western nations. 
8. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) opened in New York 
in 1973 for an organizational session. The substantive sessions were held between 1974 and 1982. The 
Conference adopted the Convention on the Law ofthe Sea at the 11th session held in New York between 
8 March and 30 April 1982. See 29 U.N. CHRONICLE 12-15 Gune 1982). The Convention was signed on 
December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica on behalf of 117 states. The Final Act, U.N. Doc. 
NCONF.62/121, reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1245 (1982), contains a review of the origins 
and history of UNCLOS III. 
9. For example, since both the United States and the Soviet Union are the largest naval powers, they 
have identical concerns in maximizing high seas freedoms and safeguarding unimpeded transit 
through international straits. 
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more or less reflective of the current state of the law, it will provide a major point 
of reference for the present inquiry. Following some preliminary considerations 
on the NIEO as a political ideology of the developing nations, the article ad-
dresses briefly the international legal aspects of the NIEO, embodied primarily 
in resolutions and other acts of international organizations. Proceeding to the 
implications of the NIEO for the evolving rules of the new law of the sea, the 
article focuses on various dimensions of two major issues: the expansion of the 
coastal state jurisdiction, both in offshore waters and the subjacent seabed, and 
the exploitation of the "common heritage of mankind" in the seabed beyond 
national jurisdiction. The article concludes with an appraisal of the ideological 
challenges in the law of the sea in terms of their contribution to the realization of 
a new equitable international economic order. 
II. THE NIEO AS A POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
Political ideology, for the purposes of this article, may be defined as a more or 
less coherent body of images, ideas, and values, which critically interpret the 
existing societal order and offer political leaders a strategy of action for the 
attainment of a better, preferred order of things.!O In terms of this working 
definition, the phenomenon of the NIEO certainly may be considered the 
ideology of the developing world. 
First, the NIEO offers an interpretation of the origin and state of the present 
international order. It finds the present system inequitable and unjust because 
"[t]he developing countries, which constitute 70 per cent of the world popula-
tion, account for only 30 per cent of the world's income."!! According to the 
NIEO ideology, this gap, which continues to widen, was established at a time 
when the great majority of the developing countries did not even exist as 
independent states. Moreover, the present international economic order is in 
conflict with current developments in international political and economic rela-
tions, such as the growing role of less developed countries as suppliers of energy 
and raw materials and the emergence of new economic power centers such as the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Furthermore, the de-
veloping countries believe that they are playing a disproportionately minor role 
in the formulation and application of decisions that concern the whole interna-
tional community. Second, the NIEO offers a set of principles on which a new 
10. For some definitions of ideology, see e.g., D. EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 
289·91 (1965); La Palombara, Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and Reinterpretation, 60 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 5 
(1966); Shils, Ideology: The Concept and Function of Ideology, 7 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. ScI. 66 (1968); 
Herz, International Relations: Ideological Aspects, 8 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. SCI. 69 (1968). 
II. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, May I, 1974, G.A. 
Res. 3201, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. I) at 3, U.N. Doc. N9556 (1974), reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL 
MATERIALS 715 (1974) [hereinafter cited as NIEO Declaration]. 
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and more just order ought to be founded l2 and a detailed and comprehensive 
program of action for the establishment of such an order.13 
The NIEO exhibits other characteristics which distinguish an ideology from 
other types of comprehensive patterns of political thought, such as doctrines, 
platforms, or theories.14 First, its basic premises are explicitly formulated and 
promulgated in three fundamental acts: the Declaration on the Establishment of 
a NIEO,15 the Programme of Action, 16 and the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States.17 To the developing world, these instruments represent an 
authoritative promulgation of the NIEO ideology. Second, the NIEO includes 
mutually reinforcing empirical and normative elements: it describes in critical 
terms the status of the existing order and proclaims how it should be trans-
formed. 18 Third, it is relatively comprehensive in scope and integrated around 
particular cognitive and moral beliefs, notably a belief in the existing inequality 
between the rich and the poor nations and an emphasis on the preeminent value 
of real equality and justice among the members of international society.19 
Fourth, as a political ideology the NIEO is associated with one or more corporate 
bodies, namely the United Nations and various agencies of the U.N. system, 
which serve as an institutional framework for the realization of the NIEO 
objectives.20 It must be stressed that despite its name, the NIEO is not just an 
economic ideology. Instead, it is an international political ideology. The less 
developed countries not only demand a larger share of the planet's wealth but 
also insist on, and give priority to, control of international decision-making 
processes in the name of real sovereign equality of states.21 The implications of 
this emphasis on the control of multilateral decision-making were obvious at 
UNCLOS III where the composition, powers, and voting in the International 
Seabed Authority (ISA) were a major controversial issue between the indus-
12. ld. at para. 4 (listing the principles on which the NIEO ought to be founded). 
13. See Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, May 1, 
1974, G.A. es. 3202, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.1) at 5, U.N. Doc. Al9556 (1974), reprinted in 13 INT'L 
LEGAL MATERIALS 720 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Programme of Action]. 
14. See Shils, supra note 10, at 66. 
15. See NIEO Declaration, supra note 11. 
16. See Programme of Action, supra note 13. 
17. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 12, 1974, G.A. Res. 3281, 30 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. Al9631 (1975)[hereinafter cited as Charter], reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL 
MATERIALS 251 (1975). 
18. For example, the NIEO Declaration, supra note II, in paragraph 1 refers to the gap between the 
developed and the developing countries, and then makes a normative statement on what ought to be 
done about it. (principles of the NIEO). 
19. See, e.g., the NIEO Declaration, supra note 11, para. 4(b)(C)(j). 
20. NIEO Declaration, supra note II, para. 6. "The United Nations as a universal organization 
should be capable of dealing with problems of international economic co-operation in a comprehensive 
manner and ensuring equally the interests of all countries. It must have an even greater role in the 
establishment of a new international economic order." ld. 
21. ld. para. 4(c). 
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trialized West and the Group of 77. 22 Finally, despite great economic and other 
differences that exist among the Third World nations, developing states have 
given priority to their common ideology even if adherence to it may run counter 
to their particular national interests. Even if national interests are followed, they 
are dressed in the garb of the ideological rhetoric of the NIEO. 
Ill. THE NIEO AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 
A. NIEO Challenges to Traditional International Law 
The developing countries' criticism of the existing international order as based 
on the laissez-faire ideology of economic liberalism is matched by their discon-
tent with traditional international law, which reflects, in their view, the unjust 
economic and political reality.23 As applied to economic relations, traditional 
international law assumed freedom of contract and formal equality before the 
law but it did not guarantee equality in bargaining power and equitable distribu-
tion of wealth and opportunity. Hence, the NIEO strategy has been to incorpo-
rate rules into the body of international law which would both "bring legal and 
material equality into greater concordance"24 and to obligate rich nations to take 
into special consideration the needs and interests of developing nations. "Pref:' 
erential and non-reciprocal treatment for developing countries, wherever feasI-
ble, in all fields of international economic co-operation whenever possible" is one 
of the fundamental principles of the NIEO.25 Under traditional international 
law, considerations of equity and natural justice are incom patible with a system 
of sovereign states in which justice means legal equality, reciprocity, and impar-
tiality. Therefore, it is exactly these principles which are being questioned by the 
NIEO.26 
The NIEO strategy has been, first, to build up and expand the law of coopera-
tion - the "international economic development law"27 - into new fields such 
as, for example, transfer of technology, transnational corporations, and access to 
ocean resources. In addition, the NIEO strategy is to reinterpret the traditional 
principle of "equality" to mean not only legal equality but also equality of 
22. Stt also intra text at notes 145 to 157. 
23. For the sharpest denunciation of the traditional "oligarchic" and "plutocratic" international law , 
see M. BEDJAOUl, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 49-63 (1979). This is an English 
translation of the original French POUR UN NOUVEL ORDRE ECONOMIQUE INTERNATIONAL (1979). 
24. W. LEVI, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 125 (1976). 
25. NIEO Declaration, supra note 11, para. 4(n). 
26. Whether it is possible to build a system of international law in which legal equality can be made 
compatible with material equity is another problem. 
27. For early conceptualization of the "international economic development law" see B. ROLING, 
INTERNATIONAL LAw IN AN EXPANDED WORLD (1960); W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 176-81 (1964). The idea is developed further in W. VERWEY, ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT, PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972). 
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economic opportunity and human dignity. It is beyond the purview of this study 
to elaborate on all of the international law implications of the NIEO demands for 
equity. This theme, however, is developed in its application to specific issues of 
the NIEO challenges in the international law of the sea.2~ One caveat that must 
be made when discussing NIEO challenges to international law is that Third 
World countries do not reject Western international law as such. Quite the 
contrary, like the Soviet Union,29 they endorse the basic principles of the law of 
coexistence, including the bulk of its rules delimiting national sovereign rights, 
such as equality of states and the consensual nature of international law. What 
underlies the split between the Western nations' and the developing world's 
approaches to international law are differences not of culture, but of economic 
and political interests. 
B. Converting NIEO Principles into International Legal Obligations 
The Declaration and the Programme of Action of 1974 and the Charter of 
1975 are the most explicit and basic formulations of the NIEO ideology. They 
are the culmination of a long series of previous, less comprehensive international 
acts and declarations,30 especially those adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly, by the Group of 77 at the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCT AD), and by non-aligned nations conferences.31 As Gen-
eral Assembly "resolutions," the fundamental instruments that have shaped the 
NIEO ideology are only recommendatory in nature. Contrary to the position of 
the developing nations, they are not legally binding acts unless one assumes that 
they reflect otherwise existing customary international law . 32 The latter possibil-
28. See Johnston, The New Equity in the Law oJ the Sea, 31 INT'LJ. 79 (1976); Hossain,Equitable Solutions 
in the International Law oj the Sea: Some Problems, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER 193 (K. Hossain ed. 1980). 
29. See generally K. GRZYBOWSKI, SoVIET PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: DOCTRINES AND DIPLOMATIC 
PRACTICE (1970). 
30. See, e.g., Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, December 14, 1962, G.A. 
Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1963) reprinted in 2 INT'L Legal M~­
TERIAI.S 223 (1963). 
31. For a survey of the historical background of the NIEO, dating from the inter-war period, see 
R. MEAGER, supra note. 4. 
32. The much discussed problem of the legal status of U.N. General Assembly resolutions is beyond 
the scope of this inquiry. The issue and especially the validity of the NIEO Declaration, see supra note II, 
and the Charter, see supra note 17, were analyzed in the Arbitral Award of 19 January 1977 in the 
dispute between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company (TOPCO/ 
CALASIATIC) v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, Award on Merits, January 19, 1977 
[hereinafter cited as TOPCO/CALASIATIC Award]. The English translation of the Award is repro-
duced in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS I (1978). The sole arbitrator, Professor Rene Jean Dupuy, followed 
the Western view. The case is discussed in von Mehren & Kourides,lnternational Arbitrations between States 
and Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 476 (1981). The authors list 
a rich bibliography supporting the view that General Assembly resolutions are not legally binding. Id. 
at 524 n.177. Authors discussing the legal status of the U.N. General Assembly resolutions include 
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ity does not exist in the present case since the NIEO Declaration, although 
adopted without a vote, was accompamed by reservations expressed by thirty-
eight delegations, and the vote on the 1975 Charter unambiguously shows a lack 
of general consensus.33 Nevertheless, such resolutions may provide moral and 
political guidance for those states that supported them. 34 Moreover, if the 
resolutions are "repeated by and acquiesced in by sufficient numbers with 
sufficient frequency," they may be instrumental in the development of interna-
tionallaw, eventually attaining the status of such law.35 Even then, however, the 
legal value of such resolutions would vary considerably, depending on the type 
of resolution and the conditions attached to its adoption and its provisions.36 As 
far as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States is concerned, the 
U.N. General Assembly itself did not consider it as a first step toward the 
codification of international law - that is, an instrument formulating in writing 
the rules of customary international law.37 In any case, the very fact that the 
three major NIEO Resolutions refer to a "new" international economic order 
seems to negate the claim that they are declaratory of existing law.3s The 
recommendatory nature of these basic NIEO acts has important legal implica-
tions for the law of the sea since it means that the N lEO-inspired demands of the 
Group of 77 are not, or at least not yet, predicated on a firm and broad legal 
basis. 
Although the ideas of the NIEO have been articulated primarily through 
resolutions of international organizations, which must be analyzed "as a political 
rather than as a legal declaration concerned with the ideological strategy of 
Arangio-Ruiz, The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Declaration of 
Principles of Friendly Relations, 137 RECUEIL DES COURS 419, 434-518 (1972); Johnson, The Effect of 
Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 97 (1955-56);J. CASTANEDA, 
LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (1969); Falk, On the Q)Jasi-Legislative Competence of the 
General Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1966). 
33. Major industrialized countries, believing that the Charter discriminated against them, either 
voted against the Charter or abstained. Among the provisions rejected by the United States are: the way 
the Charter treats foreign investment, namely in terms which do not take into account the "minimum 
standard of justice" under international law , the endorsement of the concepts of producers' carrels and 
indexation of prices. See Statement of Sen. Charles Percy, U.S. Representative in the Second Committee 
of the U.N.G.A. explaining the U.S. position on the Charter in DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 496-97 (A. Rovine ed. 1975). 
34. Such is the opinion of Eric Suy, Under Secretary General and Legal Counsel of the United 
Nations who represents the view that General Assembly resolutions have no legally binding force for 
member states. See Suy, Innovations in International Law-Making Processes, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAw 
AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 187, 190 (R. Macdonald, D. Johnston, 8< G. Morris eds. 1978). 
35. R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS 2 (1963). 
36. TOPCO/CALASIATIC Award, supra note 32, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS I, 29 
(1978). 
37. TOPCO/CALASIATIC Award, supra note 32, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS I, 30 
(1978). 
38. See Akehurst, Custom as a Source '!lInternational Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1,6 (1975). 
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developll\ent,"39 traditionally recognized sources of international law have also 
played a role in implementing the NIEO principles. A number of multilateral 
conventions, such as the Lome II Convention between the European Commu-
nity and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries,40 have also contributed to 
converting and implementing the NIEO principles into legally binding interna-
tional obligations. Customary law has also played a role in this process. In the law 
of the sea, for example, the emergence of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),41 
historically a product of the NIEO thinking, could for all practical purposes be 
considered a customary rule of internationallaw42 since it has been adopted by a 
great majority of coastal states with the acquiescence of others, thereby becoming 
part of customary international law . The most noteworthy attem pt to im plement 
the ideology of the NIEO into a legally binding treaty, however, has been the 
codification and progressive development of the legal regime of the oceans, 
undertaken by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
IV. EXPANSION OF THE COASTAL STATE JURISDICTION: THE EEZ 
This section discusses the application of the international legal aspects of the 
NIEO to the law of the sea, the branch of public international law which, because 
of its ideological undertones, has become perhaps the most publicized and 
controversial. As articulated in the Declaration of 1974, the NIEO ideology 
proclaims an urgent need to establish a new legal order. This order is based 
primarily upon equity, sovereign equality, and independence and is designed to 
redress existing injustices and to eliminate the widening gap between the devel-
oped and the developing countries.43 Except for stressing the need to pay 
particular attention to landlocked and island developing countries,44 however, 
the Declaration does not explicitly deal with law of the sea issues. 45 The framers 
39. TOPCO/CALASIATIC Award, supra note 32, reprintl!d in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS I, 30 
(1978). 
40. Both the Final Act of the EEC-ACP Lome II Meeting of October 31, 1979 and the Convention 
are reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 327, 341 (1980). 
41. The "Exclusive Economic Zone" (EEZ) is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea. Its 
width, including the territorial sea, is 200 nautical miles. The coastal state has sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting natural resources as well as jurisdiction with regard to marine 
scientific research, establishment and use of artificial islands, and the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment. Convention, supra note 2, arts. 55, 56, 57. For the origins of the EEZ, see Nawaz, 
The Emergence of Exclusive Economic Zone: Implicationsfor a New Law of the Sea, 16 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 471 
(1976). See also infra notes 52-68 and accompanying text. For the introduction of the EEZ by the United 
States, see Proclamation 5030 of March 30, 1983, reprinted in 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 461 (1983). 
42. But see contra, e.g., Bernhardt, Verfall und Neubildung von Gewohnheitsrecht im Meeresviilkerrecht, in 
RECHT UBER SEE [FESTSCHRIFT FUR ROLF STODTER] 155 (H. Ipsen & K.H. Necker eds. 1979). 
43. NIEO Declaration, supra note II, Preamble. 
44. Id., para. 4(c). 
45. The Charter, supra note 17, art. 29, however, reaffirms the "common heritage of mankind" 
nature of the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, 
as well as the resources of the Area, according to the principles adopted by the General Assembly 
Resolution of 17 December 1970, infra note 84. 
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of the Declaration did not integrate the oceans into their comprehensive NIEO 
policy framework. Marine policy issues were perhaps too specialized and possibly 
too controversial even within the Group of 77 to be specifically mentioned in the 
NIEO manifesto.46 
Nevertheless, most of the Declaration's principles have significant implications 
for the management of the oceans and the law of the sea. Most prominent 
among the NIEO principles is that of "preferential and non-reciprocal treatment 
for developing countries."47 More than fifty variations of the phrase "special 
interests and needs of developing countries" are reiterated in various contexts of 
the Convention of 1982,48 which makes an attempt to apply a fundamental 
46. For reasons of this neglect, see Borgese, The New International Econumic Order and the Law of the Sea, 
in THE LAw OF THE SEA: ISSUES IN OcEAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 82, 83-84 (D. Walsh ed. 1977) 
[hereinafter cited as Borgese,New International Econtmlic Order]. For a discussion of the various aspects of 
the relationship between the NIEO and the law of the sea, see LAw OF THE SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND 
(R. Anand ed. 1978); Borgese,supra; Borgese, The New International Economic Order and the Law of the Sea, 
14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 584 (1977); Borgese, De nieuwe internationale economiske orde en het zeerecht, 30 
INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR 707 (1976); Borrmann, Neue Weltwirtschaftsordnung und intemationales 
Seerecht, in DIE NEUE WELTWIRTSCHAFTSORDNUNG 131 (D. Kebschull ed. 1977); Daudi,Notas solrre el nuevo 
orden econ6mico internacional y el derecho del mar, in ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL [HOMENALE AL 
PROFESOR MIAJA DE LA MUELA] 651 (1979); Costache Ciubotaru, Dreptul marii si exigentele noii ordini 
economice si politice mondiale, in CATRE 0 NOVA ORDINE INTERNATIONALA 460 (N. Ecobescu ed. 1976) 
[RoumaniaJ; Djalal, The Developing Countries and the Law of the Sea Conference, 15 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 22 
(1980); Gulland, Developing Countries and the New Law of the Sea, 22 OcEANUS 36 (1979); LEGAL ASPECTS 
OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (K. Hossain ed. 1980), (especially Part III which includes 
contributions by Koh, Paolillo, Oda, Faundez, Caminos, and Hossain); Juda, UNCLOS III and the New 
International Economic Order, 7 OCEAN DEV. INT'L L. 221 (1979); Lynch, The Law af the Sea and the 
Developing Countries: Cornucopia or Catastrophe?, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: ISSUES IN OcEAN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT 117 (D. Walsh ed. 1977); Manley, Developing Nation Imperatives for a New Law of the Sea: 
UNCLOS I and III as Stages in the International Policy Process, 7 OCEAN DEV. INT'L L. 9 (1979); Mehrish, The 
Role af the Third World in the Law af the Sea Negotiations, 28 FOREIGN AFF. REP. 31 (1979); Mesloub, 
Troisieme Conference sur Ie Droit de la Mer et Ie Nouvel Ordre Econtmlique International: Considirations 
Generales, 15 REv. ALGER. ScI. JUR. ECON. POL. 292 (1978); Morris, The New International Economic Order 
in the New Law of the Sea, in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 175 (K. Sauvant & 
H. Hasenpflug eds. 1977); Ogley, The Law af the Sea Draft Convention and the New International Economic 
Order, 5 MARINE POLICY 240 (1981); A. PARDO & E. BORGESE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
ORDER AND THE LAw OF THE SEA (1975); Rangel,A Carttlnternacional deJustit;a e 0 direitodo mar, 7I REv. 
FAC. DIR. UNIV. SAo PAULO 239 (1976); SEERECHTSKONFERENZ UND DRITTE WELT (A. Studier ed. 1980); 
Szekely, El derecho del mar y la Carta de Derechos y Deberes Econ6micos de los Estados, in DERECHO ECON6MICO 
INTERNACIONAL 340 (J. Castaneda ed. 1976); Vitzthum, Neue Weltwirtschoftsordnung und neue 
Weltmeeresordnung: Innere Widerspruche bei zwei Ansatzen zu sektoralen Weltordnungen, 33 EUROPA. ARCHIV. 
455 (1978) [English version in 19 L. & S. 7 (1979)]; Vitzthum, The Searchfor Sectoral World Orders -
Parallels between Attempts to Build Maritime and Economic World Orders, in ASPEKTE DER 
SEERECHTSENTWICKLUNG 273 (W. Vitzthum ed. 1980); Vitzthum, Peaceful Change through International 
Lawmaking: As Exemplified by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 23 L. & S. 7 (1981). 
For further bibliographic references, see Morris & Ferriera, Latin America, Africa, and the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Annotated Bibliography, 9 OcEAN DEV. INT'L L. 101 (1981). 
47. NIEO Declaration, supra note II, para. 4(n). 
48. Convention, supra note 2, Preamble; art. 61(3) (conservation of the living resources of the EEZ); 
an. 62(2)(3)( 4)(a) (utilization of the living resources of the EEZ); art. 69 (right of land-locked states); art. 70 
(right of states with special geographical characteristics); art. 82(3)(4) (payments and contributions with 
respect to the exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles); art. 119 (conservation of the 
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principle of the NIEO to a vital part of international law. This NIEO principle is 
discussed first in regard to the NIEO-motivated emergence of extended fisheries 
jurisdiction. 
A. Challenges to the Existing Order 
By the time that the demands of the developing countries for a NIEO were 
comprehensively articulated in the 1974 Declaration, and the UNCLOS III 
convened in Caracas in 1974 for its first substantive session, important areas of 
the law of the sea and, in particular, the coastal jurisdiction, had already been 
affected by the growing conflict between the industrialized maritime nations and 
the countries of the "South." Consistent with their criticism of the laissez-faire 
ideology of traditional international law, Third World countries challenged its 
corollary, the principle of the freedom of the seas, as developed by the more 
powerful and now technologically superior maritime states. 49 As claimed by 
Third World spokesmen, the principle of the freedom of the seas, along with the 
corresponding rule of a narrow territorial sea jurisdiction of the coastal state,50 
living resources of the high seas); art. 140(1)(2) (activities in the "Area" for the benefit of mankind); art. 
143(2)(b) (marine scientific research); art. 144 (transfer of deep seabed technology); art. 148 (participation 
of developing states in activities in the Area); art. 151(4) (production policies); art. 152 (exercise of power 
by the Authority); art. 155(2) (review conference); art. 160(2)0)(k) (powers and functions of the Assembly); 
art. 161(I)(c)(d)(e); art. 161(2)(b) (composition, procedure, and voting in the Council); art. I 64(2)(b) 
(Economic Planning Commission); art. 202 (scientific and technical assistance to developing states in 
protecting and preserving the marine environment); art. 203 (preferential treatment for developing states 
in the area of protecting and preserving the marine environment); art. 207(4) (pollution from land-based 
sources); art. 244(2) (publication and dissemination of marine scientific information and knowledge); arts. 
266(2), 268(d), 269(a), 271 to 276 (development and transfer of marine technology). See also Convention, 
supra note 2, Annex 1\1 (basic conditions of prospecting, exploration, and exploitation); art. 5(3)(e) 
(transfer of deep seabed technology); art. 8 (reservation of sites); art. 9 (activities in reserved sites); art. 13 
(financial terms of contracts); Annex IV (Statute of the Enterprise); art. 12(3)(b)(ii). 
49. All major maritime states, particularly Great Britain, contributed to the development of the 
principle of the freedom of the sea. For a historical review of this principle, see I D. O'CONNELL, supra 
note 2, at 1-20. 
50. Vntil the time the First Vnited Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea convened in Geneva in 
1958, most coastal states claimed only a three mile territorial sea. More and more countries, however, 
especially those of the Third World, claimed more, usually twelve or more miles. There was no 
definitive rule in international law concerning the width of the territorial sea. By the time VNCLOS 1\1 
met in Caracas in 1974 there had developed a consensus that a twelve mile maximum would be the rule. 
This limit was adopted in the Convention (art. 3). For a detailed historical analysis see I D. O'CONNELL, 
supra note 2, at 124-69. 
The rule of a narrow territorial sea jurisdiction of the coastal state was legitimized in the 1958 Geneva 
Law of the Sea Conventions. These four conventions were, in general, a codification of the existing 
customary law of the sea. See Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13 V.S.T. 2312, T.l.A.S. No. 
5200,450 V.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15 
V.S.T. 1606, T.l.A.S. No. 5639, 516 V.N.T.S. 205 (By implication, Article 24(2) of this Convention 
limited the territorial sea to not more than twelve miles, the allowable width of the contiguous zone.); 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 17 
V.S.T. 138, T.l.A.S. No. 5969, 559 V.N.T.S. 285. The fourth convention, the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 V.S.T. 471, T.l.A.S. No. 5578, 499 V.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter 
cited as Convention on the Continental shelf], dealt with a relatively recent problem. 
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benefitted only developed nations. It allowed developed nations to exercise 
influence throughout the oceans and to exploit and deplete marine resources off 
the coasts of developing countries by means of distant-water fishing fleets. 51 Such 
exploitation led to the expansion of coastal waters jurisdiction initiated some 
thirty-five years ago by Latin American countries, especially those with long coast 
Iines.52 Their example was subsequently followed by many nations of Africa and 
Asia and finally was adopted in various legal forms by virtually all nations, 
including the United States. 53 It is beyond the scope of this article to deal at 
length with the trend toward wider territorial seas or with the history of the 
"enclosure" movement54 in the form of 200 mile "fishery zones," "patrimonial 
sea,"55 or the EEZ.56 The following discussion is limited to the ideological 
implications of the emergence of the EEZ with particular emphasis on the 
regulation of this issue in the Convention of 1982. 
From the perspective of a Latin American country with long coast lines, the 
extension of coastal jurisdiction may be consistent with the NIEO because it was 
directed against fishing, research, and other "encroachments" of developed 
countries which engaged in such activities far from their own shores. In this 
sense, extended coastal jurisdiction was a logical extension of various resolutions 
of the U.N. General Assembly proclaiming the right of peoples and nations ~o 
establish permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources.57 
Along thIS line of reasoning, Mexican President Echeverria Alvarez stated at 
UNCLOS III that "the law of the sea formulated by the Conference could be a 
powerful instrument which would enable the third world to achieve permanent 
51. In 1972, about sixty per cent of the world catch was taken by developed countries. While nearly all 
of the non-local catch was taken by fishermen from developed countries, about a third was caught off 
the coast of developing countries. See Gulland, World Fisheries and Fish Stocks, I MARINE POLICY 179, 
179-89 (1977). 
52. Latin American claims are described in F. ORREGO VICUNA, Los FONDOS MARINOS Y OCEANICOS: 
JURIDICCION NACIONAL Y REGIMEN INTERNATIONAL 6!>-96 (1976). For a convenient review, see A. HOL-
LICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAw OF THE SEA 67-95 (1981). 
53. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 33 I, reprinted in 
15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 634 (1976). 
54. The term "enclosure" refers to the extension of coastal states' jurisdiction over natural resources 
200 miles seawards, thereby enclosing the sea. See R. ECKERT, THE ENCWSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES: 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAw OF THE SEA (1979). 
55. "Fishery Zones" are zones proclaimed only for purposes of exclusive jurisdiction over fisheries. 
See I D. O'CONNELL, supra note 2, at 510-51. "Patrimonial Sea" is a concept developed by the Caribbean 
and Central American states, virtually synonymous with the EEZ. See A. HOLLIcK,supra note 52, at 252. 
56. The evolution of the concept of the EEZ is described in W. EXTAVOUR, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC 
ZoNE: A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE 
SEA (1979). See also Hollick, The Origins of 200-Mile Offshore Zones, 7I AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1977). 
57. See, e.g., Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, para. I, December 14, 
1962, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) at 9, U.N. Doc. N5207 (1963), reprinted in 2 INT'L 
LEGAL MATERIALS 223 (1963). 
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and effective sovereignty over its natural resources, and which, indirectly, would 
make for a more democratic and juster [sic] international division of labor."58 
What has been noted above with respect to the Third World's attitude toward 
"Western" international law in general is equally true of the law of the sea as a 
whole. That is, although questioning in their view of the "outlived" functions of 
the freedom of the seas, developing countries do not pose a wholesale challenge 
to the traditional law of the oceans. On the contrary, they wholeheartedly uphold 
those rules of traditional law which grant them legal protection for their growing 
nationalistic interests in navigation, resource exploitation, and other uses of the 
sea. As stated by the Argentinian delegate at UNCLOS III, "[n]ot all the norms 
of the old law were anachronistic. What needed to be changed basically was the 
philosophy and values of the legal order."59 
B. Differing National Interests among the Developing Nations 
The geographical circumstances of the enclosure movement are not necessar-
ily favorable to the developing world, as will be discussed below in more detail. 
Hence, on more sober calculation by the Third World, expansion of coastal 
jurisdiction should have remained outside the ideological conflict between the 
rich and the poor countries. Instead, the Latin Americans' struggle to assert their 
claims against the United States was perceived by the majority of Third World 
countries, especially those with long coast lines, as part of an ideological struggle 
against neo-colonialism and imperialism and for a redistribution of the world's 
resources. This ideological bias was encouraged by the skillful leadership of the 
Latin Americans, who succeeded in combining the sensitive and symbolic issue of 
the international regime of the "common heritage of mankind"60 with claims for 
extended coastal jurisdiction. 61 Since developed countries initially opposed the 
concept of the EEZ,62 many developing countries, some of them lacking ade-
58. I UNCLOS I1I Off. Rec. 195, 198 (1975). 
59. ld. at 73. 
60. The concept of the "common heritage of mankind," eventually adopted in Article 136 of the 
Convention as the principal basis for the regulation of deep sea mining, originated in the proposal 
submitted to the U.N. General Assembly by Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo. Under Pardo's proposal, 
the seabed and its resources would not be subject to national appropriation, would be reserved 
exclusively for peaceful purposes, and would be managed in common for the benefit of mankind, 
taking into consideration the interests and needs of the developing countries. See discussion infra § VI. 
See also A. PARDO, THE COMMON HERITAGE: SELECTED PAPERS ON OcEANS AND WORW ORDER 1967-1975 
(1975). For a more recent discussion, see, e.g., Van Dyke 8< Yuen, "Common Heritage" v. "Freedom" of the 
High Seas: Which Governs the Seabed', 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 493 (1982); Saffo, The Common Heritage if 
Mankind: Has the General Assembly Created a Law to Govern Seabed Mining', 53 TULANE L. REv. 492 (1979); 
Borgese, Law of the Sea: The Next Phase, 4 THIRD WORW Q. 698 (1982); see generally Larschan 8< Brennan, 
The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle in International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305 (1983). 
61. See A. Hollick, supra note 52, at 171. See also Pohl, Latin America's Inj/tUnce and Role in the Third 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 7 OcEAN DEV. INT'L L. 65 (1979). 
62. In 1974, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and United States accepted the demands of the 
developing countries to include the concept of the EEZ in the Convention. See A. HOLucK, supra note 
52, at 286. For the adoption of the EEZ by the United States, see supra note 41. 
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quate expertise in marine affairs, simplistically believed that the EEl idea must 
necessarily be in their interests. Thus, by the time of the Caracas session in 1974, 
the 200 mile exclusive economic zone had become a major component in the 
rallying cry of the Group of 77. 63 African countries with long coast lines, which 
greatly contributed to articulating the EEl concept, were lured by the prospect 
of the potential wealth of their respective zones. Even those developing states 
characterized as landlocked or geographically disadvantaged states (LL-GDS), 
which were becoming increasingly aware of the adverse effects of the EEl for 
their own development, reluctantly followed the ideological trend to avoid 
charges of being in the service of the rich countries. The Group of 77's rejection 
of the narrow coastal jurisdiction and its members' perception of the 200 mile 
zone as a pillar of a more equitable legal order of the oceans is illustrated by the 
following statement of the Tanzanian delegate at UNCLOS 11I: 
Freedom of the seas had ceased to serve the interests of international 
justice. It had become a catch word and an excuse for a few countries 
to exploit ruthlessly the resources of the sea, to terrorize the world 
and to destroy the marine environment. That type of freedom be-
longed to the old order and had outlived its time.64 
Due to the LL-GDS' increasing awareness and assertiveness of their own 
particular interests, however, the clear-cut ideological North-South division on 
the extended coastal jurisdiction issue could not be maintained. The LL-GDS, 
including both developed and developing countries, had already proposed in 
Caracas that they be granted the right to participate in the exploration and 
exploitation of the economic zones of neighboring coastal states "on an equal and 
non-discriminatory basis."65 If applied to poor beneficiaries, the idea is entirely 
consistent with the NIEO principle of equitable treatment of all nations. 
Nonetheless, it was rejected by the developing coastal states as derogating from 
their sovereignty over natural resources.66 With mounting pressure from the 
63. The concept of the 200 mile EEZ as such was considered at the 1972 Yaounde Regional Seminar 
on the Law of the Sea and was formulated at Caracas in the African Draft Articles on the EEZ. U.N. 
Doc. NCONF. 62/C.2/L.82, in 3 UNCLOS III Off. Rec. 240 (1975). The African states' role at 
UNCLOS III is reviewed in N. REMBE, AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA: A STUDY OF 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE AFRICAN STATES TO THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF 
THE SEA (1980). 
64. I UNCLOS III Off. Rec. 93, 93 (1975) (comments of Mr. Warioba). Cf Anand, 'Tyranny" 0/ the 
Freedom of the Seas Doctrine, 12 INT'L STUDIES 416 (1973) for the characterization of the doctrine of the 
freedom of the seas as "tyrannical." But even this author from a country that has much to win from the 
EEZ admits that "some nagging questions ... still remain to be solved." Anand, Winds of Change in the 
Law of the Sea, in LAw OF THE SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND (R. Anand ed. 1978). 
65. 3 UNCLOS III Off. Rec. 216, 216 (1975). Cf similar previous unsuccessful attempts by Uganda 
and Zambia to establish economic zones on a regional or subregional basis. U.N. Doc. NAC 138/89, 
P.C., No.9; NAC.138/SC.1IIL.41 (1973). 
66. A. HOLLICK, supra note 52, at 295. 
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large group of the LL-GDS, non-discriminatory access to the resources of the 
EEZ became one of the most controversial issues at the Conference, severely 
undermining the ideologically based solidarity of the Group of 77. 67 The Draft 
Convention falls short of the expectations of the LL-GDS even though -,orne 
concessions were made in their favor. 68 
C. Compatibility of the EEl and NIEO Ideology 
The creation of the EEZ represents a serious reduction in the size of the 
international area of the "common heritage of mankind," removing from it 
almost one third of the ocean space and 80 per cent of fish stocks (let alone the 
resources of the continental shelf).69 Furthermore, pure geography favors, on 
total balance, the developed rather than developing countries. Data reveal that 
twenty-five countries will gain control of 76 per cent of the world EEZ.70 Thir-
teen of these countries are developed, the most fortunate winners among them 
being Australia, Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South 
Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United States. These thirteen developed 
nations acquire 48 per cent of the 76 per cent of the EEZ controlled by the 
twenty-five countries, whereas the twelve lucky developing nations (some of 
them not the least developed but "threshold" nations) will gain only 28 per 
cent. 71 On balance, therefore, 46 per cent of the enclosed ocean area will go to 
the rich countries, which represent only 25 per cent of the world's total popula-
tion, whereas 54 per cent of such area will go to the poor countries, which 
account for 75 per cent of the world's population. 72 Although some developing 
countries, such as Mauritania and Namibia, are gaining rich fishing resources, 
many least developed states, and especially the geographically disadvantaged 
and landlocked ones, will receive little or no benefits. 73 Most will not be able to 
utilize their zones until they develop an appropriate technological infrastructure 
to manage their offshore resources. 74 The facts of geography show, therefore, 
that the redistribution of fishmgjurisdiction through the medium of the EEZ will 
only aggravate the inequities which this ideology purports to rectify. 
67. See id. at 294-95. 
68. See infra notes 75 to 77 and accompanying text. 
69. Bulajic, Legal Aspects of a New International Economic Order, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 52 (K. Hossain ed. 1980). 
70. See Nepal's Memorandum Relating to the Establishment of a Common Heritage Fund. U.N. Doc. 
NCONF. 62/65, May 8, 1978, in 9 UNCLOS III Off. Rec. 175, at 176 [hereinafter cited as Nepal's 
Memorandum]. See infra text accompanying note 100. See also I D. O'CONNELL,supra note 2, at 552 n.1. 
71. Nepal's Memorandum, supra note 70. 
72. Johnston. supra note 28, at 88; Bulajic. supra note 69, at 52-63. citing data from THE TRILATERAL 
COMMISSION. A NEW REGIME FOR THE OCEANS 5-6 (1977). 
73. Bulajic. supra note 69. at 52. 
74. B. BOCZEK. THE TRANSFER OF MARINE TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 45 (1982). 
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There is little among the EEl provisions of the Convention that compensates 
the least developed countries for the adversities of geography or realistically 
takes into account their special interests and needs. The LL-GDS do have right 
of access to neighboring EEl,75 but only to any surplus and only under equitable 
bilateral, subregional, and regional agreements with coastal states. 76 In practice, 
the chances of any surplus are not strong. The example of Africa demonstrates 
the plight of the disadvantaged states. Fourteen out of twenty-one developing 
landlocked states are located there, next to their equally destitute but geograph-
ically more fortunate neighbors. Under such circumstances, it will be very 
difficult for these nations to agree on access to surplus fishing. A least developed 
coastal state will be more likely to maximize the return from its EEZ by entering 
into agreements with distant-water fishing countries than by concluding a 
surplus agreement with a landlocked country. Moreover, before embarking on 
the exploitation of another country's EEZ under a surplus agreement, a land-
locked country will first have to develop its own scientific and technological 
capability for ocean fishing. 77 
For developing coastal states with potential fishery resources, the development 
of appropriate fisheries technology will be crucial if they are to take advantage of 
the benefits accruing from the institution of the EEl.78 In this regard, the 
Convention provides that one of the conditions that a coastal developing state 
may impose upon nationals of other states fishing in its zone under a surplus 
agreement may relate to requirements for training personnel and transfer of 
technology, including enhancement of the coastal state's capabilities of undertak-
ing fisheries research. 79 
In sum, despite certain rather meager concessions provided in the UNCLOS 
III Convention for the less fortunate members of the Group of 77, the overall 
balance resulting from the introduction of the EEl will still weigh in favor of the 
developed countries. The leading members of the Group of 77 who enjoy the 
benefit of their favorable geographical position paid lip service to the principles 
of the NIEO, using them only for their particular self-interests. The rhetoric of 
an mternationalist ideology proved to be a smoke screen to conceal motivations 
springing from nationalism, which still remains the most powerful ideology of 
the present day international system. 
V. THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 
Like the EEZ, the developing countries' position on the resources of the 
continental shelf was determined more by geography and national interest than 
75. Convention, supra note 2, arts. 62, 69, 70. 
76. Id. 
77. The plight of the poor landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states is analyzed in 
Alexander, The "Disadvantaged" Stales and the Law of the Sea, 5 MARINE POLICY 185 (1981). 
78. See B. BOCZEK, supra note 74, at 44-45. 
79. Convention, supra note 2, art. 62(4)(j). See also B. BOCZEK, supra note 74, at 44-45. 
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by the ideology of the NIEO. The trend to extend the coastal state's jurisdiction 
was, however, initiated by the United States in 1945 by the Truman Proclama-
tion on the Continental Shelf. The Proclamation asserted U.S. jurisdiction and 
control over the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental 
shelf contiguous to the United States, without affecting the legal status of the 
superjacent waters and the high seas. 80 For the purposes of the Proclamation, 
the continental shelf was defined as that part of the seabed and subsoil adjacent to 
the coast over which the sea is not more than 100 fathoms (600 feet or about 200 
meters) in depth. 81 Many other countries followed the United States' initiative, 
and, by the time of the First U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, the concept 
of the continental shelf as interpreted by the Truman Proclamation had become 
part of customary international law of the sea. 82 This trend was codified in the 
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, which accepted the depth of 200 
meters as the limit "to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the said area."83 
The U.N. General Assembly Resolution of 1970 on the "common heritage of 
mankind"84 denied the extravagant implications of this "exploitability criterion" 
of the 1958 Convention, according to which all submarine areas could theoreti-
cally be divided among the coastal states at the deepest trenches. 85 Nevertheless, 
the principle that the continental shelf was the "natural prolongation" of the 
coastal state's land territory was adopted at UNCLOS III by broad-margin states, 
including developing ones, as an argument for the coastal state's jurisdiction to 
the outer edge of the continental margin. 86 
The "common heritage" idea of Arvid Pardo, embodied in the Declaration of 
1970 and once so enthusiastically acclaimed by the Group of 77, was disregarded 
at UNCLOS III by the broad-margin members of the Group.87 The Declaration 
of 1970 provided that the seabed and its resources beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction were the "common heritage of mankind." As such, the seabed was 
not subject to appropriation by any state and was to be managed by an interna-
80. See Truman's Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R., 1943-48 Comp., p. 67, reprinted in 59 
Stat. 884. 
81. White House Press Release, September 28, 1945, 13 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 327, at 484-85 (1945) 
reprinted in M. Whiteman, 4 D1GEST OF INTERNATlONAL LAW 757-58 (1965). 
82. I D. O'CoNNELL, supra note 2, at 475-76. 
83. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 50, art I. This clause is known as the "exploit-
ability criterion." 
84. Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, 
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, December 17, 1970, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 
(No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. Al8028 (1971), reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 220 (1971) [hereinafter 
cited as Declaration of Principles]. 
85. For the possibility of such an interpretation see, e.g., Oda, Proposals Jor Revising the Convention on 
the Continental Shelf, 7 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 9 (1978). 
86. See Ogley, supra note 46, at 242-43. 
87. A. HOLLICK, supra note 52, at 295. 
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tional regime for the benefit of mankind as a whole, with equitable sharing of 
resources, "taking into particular consideration the interest and needs of the 
developing countries, whether landlocked or coastal."~~ Unfortunately, the geo-
graphical scope of the common heritage was severely limited at UNCLOS Ill. 
Broad-margin states, including some members of the Group of 77,89 insisted on 
exclusive jurisdiction over the entire continental margin,90 disregarding the 
preferences of less developed and disadvantaged states for a shelf limit of 200 
miles. 91 The controversy over the sharing of the spoils to be carved from the 
originally conceived area of the common heritage of mankind was among the 
most disputed at UNCLOS 111.92 The compromise definition eventually adopted 
basically follows the expansive interpretation. This definition eliminates a sizeable 
portion of the common heritage since virtually all known offshore oil and gas 
deposits are found in the continental margin. 93 
Under the Convention's compromise, the continental shelf extends either to a 
distance of 200 nautical miles, if the outer edge of the continental margin does 
not reach that distance, or, if the outer edge extends beyond 200 miles, the 
continental shelf comprises the whole margin. The coastal state may not claim, 
however, more than 350 miles, except in the case of submarine elevations 
beyond that distance that are natural components of the continental margin. In 
such a case, the coastal state jurisdiction shall not extend to points beyond 2,500 
meters depth. 94 There is no provision in the Convention for a sharing with the 
developing countries of the currently exploitable rich oil and gas resources of the 
continental shelf within the 200 mile zone. Lip service is paid to the principles of 
the NIEO by a provision requiring the coastal states to share with the interna-
tional community the benefits derived from the exploitation of the shelf beyond 
200 miles. 95 Annual payments to the International Seabed Authority are to begin 
88. Declaration of Principles, supra note 84, para. 9. 
89. Among countries claiming jurisdiction over the seabed and subsoil as far as the edge of the 
continental margin are: Bangladesh, Burma, Guyana. India. Kampuchea, Pakistan. Seychelles. South 
Yemen, and Sri Lanka. I D. O·CONNELL. supra note 2. at 498 n.165. 
90. Continental margin is the whole area of the submerged portion of the continental crust. It 
includes the "continental shelf" (as used by geophysical science). the "continental slope." and the 
"continental rise" which reaches the abyssal plain (usually between 1.500 and 5.000 meters of water). /d. 
at 443-44. 
91. A. HOLLICK, supra note 52, at 344. 
92. The continental shelf debate at UNCLOS III is summarized in A. HOLLICK, supra note 52. at 
294-96, 307-08. 327-28. 344-45. 
93. Nepal's Memorandum. supra note 70. at 176; Swing, Who Will Own the Oceans', 54 FOR. AFF. 527. 
at 531 (1976). 
94. Convention, supra note 2. art. 76. The margin extends beyond 200 miles off the coasts of such 
developed countries as Australia. Canada. France, Iceland. Ireland. New Zealand, Norway. Spain. the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States and the coasts of some thirty developing 
countries including Argentina. Brazil. Ecuador, India. Indonesia. Kenya, Madagascar. Maldives. 
Mozambique. Nigeria. Pakistan, Somalia. Sri Lanka, and Tanzania. 
95. [d. at art. 82. 
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after the first five years of production, starting with one per cent of the value or 
volume of production from a site, and rising to seven per cent in the twelfth and 
subsequent years. 96 A developing state is also subject to such payments unless it is 
a net importer of a mineral resource produced in its continental shelf.97 All 
payments are distributed by the ISA on the basis of equitable sharing criteria, 
taking into account the interests and needs of developing states, particularly the 
least developed and the landlocked among them. 98 
These modest sharing provisions, restricted basically to an area of the conti-
nental margin which will hardly be commercially exploitable in the near future,99 
again demonstrate that the leading developing coastal states supported the ideas 
of the NIEO only to the extent that they served their particular national inter-
ests. This inconsistent and hypocritical attitude is evidenced by the developing 
coastal states' rejection of Nepal's 1978 proposal on the establishment of a 
Common Heritage Fund. This proposal provided for equitable and graduated 
sharing of benefits derived not only from the mineral exploitation of the conti-
nental margin beyond 200 miles, but also those resulting from exploitation 
within the 200 mile economic zone. 100 Unfortunately, this proposal, which would 
have made real progress in applying the NlEO principles in the law of the sea, 
came too late in the Conference. Furthermore, the proposal bore a politically 
awkward similarity to the United States' unpopular "trusteeship zone" idea of 
1970.101 The "trusteeship zone" called for both the renunciation of national 
claims to seabed resources beyond the depth of 200 meters and the establish-
ment beyond this point of an international regime to govern the exploitation of 
seabed resources for the benefit of the international community.102 
The general conclusion to be drawn from the emergence of the expanded 
coastal jurisdiction was expressed by Tommy T.B. Koh of Singapore, President 
of UNCLOS Ill, who, risking unpopularity with some of his colleagues in the 
Group of 77, stated that: 
far from promoting [the objective of the NIEO to narrow the exist-
ing gap between the rich and poor nations], the new Law of the Sea 
96.ld. 
97.ld. 
98.ld. 
99. Swing, supra note 93, at 536. 
100. Nepal's Memorandum, supra note 70. Two years later, in 1980, Peru appeared to support this 
proposal if the obligation were to be limited to rich countries, but later gave up the idea. Ogley, supra 
note 46, at 243, citing JohnJ. Logue's reference to U.N. Co. AlCONF. 621W.S16, April 4, 1980, in Logue, 
Moment of Choice: Will the Third World Fight for the Common Heritage Proposal? (The Common Heritage 
Institute of Villanova University, August 1980), at 2. 
101. The proposal was unpopular with the developing countries because it originated with the 
United States which the developing countries perceive as "imperialistic." Moreover, the proposal's use 
of the term "trusteeship" was ideologically objectionable to developing countries because of its "colo-
nial" connotations. Swing, supra note 93, at 535. 
102. For a discussion of this proposal see A. HOLLICK, supra note 52, at 231. 
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Treaty is likely to widen the gap .... The great majority of the 
developing countries, especially the landlocked countries, the least 
developed countries, will gain little or nothing ... instead of building 
a more progressive and equitable world order for the oceans the 
Treaty appears to have the very paradoxical effect of bringing new 
and greater wealth to the rich nations of the North and a very 
inequitable and ... undesirable consequence for the many miserable 
poor countries of Asia and Africa. l03 
19 
Thus the challenge of creating a legal basis for an equitable redistribution of a 
major portion of the oceans' resources is still facing the international community, 
now further compounded by the aggravation of the previously existing in-
equalities. 
VI. SEABED MINING 
The extension of the coastal jurisdiction at the expense of the "outlived" 
principle of the freedom of the seas has by now become an accomplished fact. 
However, the remaining major challenge in the law of the sea, the NIEO call for 
the "common heritage" of the deep seabed to be exploited for the benefit of all 
mankind, while taking into special consideration the interests and needs of 
developing nations, is only a part of the UNCLOS III Convention of the Law of 
the Seal04 which was not signed by the United States and some other indus-
trialized nations because of its provisions on the regime of the deep sea min-
ing. los This article does not deal at length with the international legal aspects of 
deep seabed mining, including the complex negotiations at UNCLOS III which 
produced the Convention's lengthy provisions on the legal status of the 
"Area"106 and the basic conditions of its exploration and exploitation. 107 Instead, 
this article limits itself to brief comments on links that exist between the NIEO 
ideology and some more important aspects of the seabed mining provisions of 
the Convention of 1982. 
103. Koh, The International Seabed and the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference: Some NIEO Issues, 
reprinted in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 164 (K. Hossain ed. 1980). 
Many other analysts agree with this conclusion. See, e.g., Borgese, New International Economic Order, supra 
note 46, at 99; Lynch, supra note 46, at 127; Vitzthum, The Searchfor Sectoral World Orders, supra note 46, 
at 284-85. Cf: Nepal's Memorandum, supra note 70. 
104. See supra note 8. 
105. 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1477 (1982). 
106. The "Area" is a legal term of the Convention, meaning the "seabed and ocean floor and subsoil 
thereof, beyond the limit of national jurisdiction." Convention, supra note 2, art. I, para. 1(1). It is 
commonly known as the deep seabed. 
107. Convention, supra note 2, Part Xl. The Area (arts. 133 to 199) and Annexes III (Basic Condi-
tions of Prospecting, Exploration and Exploitation) and IV (Statute of the Enterprise). The deep seabed 
issue has produced an enormous amount of writing. For a bibliography of books on this subject, see 
Goldie, A Selection of Books Reflecting Perspectives in the Seabed Mining Debate, 151NT'L LAW. 293 (PI. 1),445 
(PI. ll) (1981). Among the more recent studies, see, e.g., Brewer, Deep Seabed Mining: Can an Acceptable 
Regime Ever Be Found?, II OCEAN DEV. INT'L L. 25 (1982); Evriviades, The Third World's Approach to the 
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A. Ideological Conflict 
Quite apart from the North-South conflict, the issues of who has the right to 
explore and exploit the deep seabed and under what conditions such a right may 
be exercised are serious challenges to international law themselves, resulting 
from advances in technology which allow the mining of deep seabed manganese 
nodules rich in copper, nickel, cobalt, manganese, and other metals. lOB It so 
happens, however, that the two major doctrinal approaches to the progressive 
development of international law in this area are the conflicting ideologies of the 
North and South: economic liberalism and the NIEO, respectively. The first 
considers the deep seabed resources to be res nullius available, by virtue of the 
freedom of the seas, for appropriation by any nation capable of mining them. 
The second regards them as res communis, a "common heritage of mankind," to 
be shared by all irrespective of their technological capabilities. 109 In view of the 
high stakes perceived by the developing countries to be involved in deep seabed 
mining and the unclear legal status of resources beyond any nation's jurisdiction, 
it is not surprising that the seabed issue has had great attraction for the Group of 
77 as an ideal vehicle for implementing the principles of the NIEO. 
Prior to the NIEO Declaration of 1974 and the Caracas session of the same 
year, the major landmarks in the developing countries' campaign for a regime of 
the deep seabed were the Maltese proposal articulated in Pardo's address at the 
United Nations General Assembly in 1967,110 the "Moratorium" Resolution of 
1969 calling upon all states to refrain from seabed exploitation prior to the 
establishment of an international regime,111 and the "Common Heritage" Deep 
Deep Seabed, 11 OCEAN DEV. INT'L L. 201 (1982); Post, United Nations Involvement in Ocean Mining, 10 
OcEAN DEV. INT'L L. 275 (1982). For a convenient review of UNCLOS III debates on this and other 
issues through the 10th session (1981) see Oxman & Stevenson, The Preparations for the Law of the Sea 
Conference, 68 AM.]. INT'L L. I (1974); Oxman & Stevenson, The Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AM.]. INT'L L. I (1975); Oxman & Stevenson, The Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1975 Geneva Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1975); 
Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1976 New York Sessions, 71 AM.]. 
INT'L L. 247 (1977); Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1977 New York 
Session, 72 AM.]. INT'L L. 57 (1978); Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 
Seventh Session (1978), 73 AM.]. INT'L L. I (1979); Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea: The Eighth Session (1979), 74 AM. ]. INT'L L. I (1980); Oxman, The Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Ninth Session (1980), 75 AM.]. INT'L L. 21 I (1981); Oxman, The Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Tenth Session (1981), 76 AM. ]. INT'L L. I (1982). 
Results of each UNCLOS III session through 1980 are conveniently digested in A. HOLLICK, supra note 
52, at 284-349. 
108. See supra note 6. 
109. For further discussion of the concepts res nullius and res communis, see I D. O'CONNELL, supra 
note 2, at 452-58. 
110. U.N. Doc. A/6695 and NC.I1PV.1515 (1967). See supra note 60. 
I I I. Resolution of December 15, 1969, G.A. Res. 2574 D-XXIV, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) at 
I I, U.N. Doc. N7630 (1970), reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 422 (1970). 
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Seabed Declaration of 1970.u2 Unfortunately, and in violation of Pardo's con-
ception, the substance of the common heritage was severely reduced by the 
exclusion of the most valuable and currently exploitable areas of the continen-
tal shelf anQ margin. As noted above, major coastal nations, including some 
leading members of the Group of 77, did not hesitate to "nationalize" portions of 
the "common heritage" adjacent to their submerged coast lines, thus reducing by 
about thirty per cent (and perhaps eliminating altogether) any benefits that, 
according to Pardo's idea and the 1970 Declaration, might equitably accrue to 
mankind as a whole.u3 
By the time that UNCLOS III convened at Caracas in 1974, Pardo's concept of 
the indivisibility of the international area of the common heritage was dead, and 
it was taken for granted that the" Area" would include only the abyssal seabed 
with its polymetallic nodules, but not the offshore oil and gas and possibly other 
resources of the continental margin.u4 With the extended coastal jurisdiction a 
reality, and beneficial to only selected developing countries, the Group of 77 
concentrated on the political and ideological aspects of the seabed issue. l15 This 
issue became a test case for the NIEO which could serve as a precedent in other 
possible future NIEO areas of North-South negotiations.116 
B. Generally Accepted Principles 
Although implementation of the international legal regime of the seabed 
remains an open challenge, there seems to be general consensus on a number of 
112. Declaration of Principles, supra note 84. The "Common Heritage" Deep Seabed Declaration of 
1970 basically restated Pardo's proposal. 
113. See supra text accompanying notes 87 to 102. 
114. See supra discussion in § V. For the possibility of sharing benefits from the exploitation of the 
continental margin beyond 200 miles, see supra text accompanying notes 95 to 98. 
115. The link between UNCLOS III and the NIEO was acknowledged by, among others, F.B. Engo 
of Cameroon (Chairman of the First Committee) when he stated that the NIEO Declaration of 1974, 
supra note II, was of "not inconsiderable interest in dealing with the seabed issue." U.N. Doc. AlCONF. 
62/C.1IL.16 (1975). See generally, Friedheim & Dutch, The International Seabed Resources Agency Negotia-
tions and the New International Econumic Order, 31 INT'L ORGANIZATION 247, 352 (1977); Juda,supra note 
46, at 248. 
116. The exploitation of the Antarctic resources is one potential subject of North-South negotiations. 
See Note, Thaw in International Law1 Rights in Antarctica untkr the Law of Common Spaces, 87 YALE LJ. 804 
(1978); Lagoni, Antarctica's Mineral Resources in International Law, 39 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES 
OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT I (1979); Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea: Rethinking 
the Current Legal Dilemmas, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 415 (1981). It is interesting to note that at the 37th 
Session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1982, Malaysia'S Prime Minister Mahathir, while commenting 
on the Law of the Sea Convention, noted that 
there remained land areas which have neither natives nor settlers. As there was no one to 
inherit those territories - the largest of which was Antarctica - if the claims of the metropoli-
tan Powers were given up the United Nations should get involved .... Those uninhabited 
lands belonged to the international community and countries now claiming them should give 
up their claims. Either they could be administered by the United Nations or else the countries 
now claiming the lands could act as trustees for the world. 
19 U.N. CHRONICLE 18 (Dec. 1982). 
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principles which should govern seabed mining. These principles demonstrate 
the impact of the NIEO on the emerging law of the sea. Moreover, they are likely 
to endure irrespective of perhaps the only temporary objections of some indus-
trialized countries concerning the implementation of the deep seabed regime set 
up by the Convention. 
I. The Common Heritage of Mankind 
Apart from differences in the interpretation of the concept of "common 
heritage of mankind," which are due to the conflict between the res nullius and 
the res communis legal philosophies, the principle that the minerals on the deep 
seabed are a part of such heritage, to be exploited for the benefit of mankind as a 
whole and to be shared equitably by all, has been accepted as the basis of the 
deep seabed regime. This fundamental rule of the" Area" provisions of the Draft 
Convention1l7 is explicitly recognized by the unilateral national deep seabed 
legislation enacted in the United States, which declares as one of its purposes the 
encouragement of the conclusion of a law of the sea convention "which will give 
legal definition to the principle that the hard mineral resources of the deep 
seabed are the common heritage of mankind."118 However, both U.S. legislation 
and the subsequently enacted similar laws of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many,1I9 France,12o Japan,121 the Soviet Union,122 and the United Kingdom,123 
117. Convention, supra note 2, art~ 140. . 
118. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, U.S. Pub. L. 96-283, 30 U.S.C. 1401 § 2(b)(l) (1980), 
reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1003, 1004 (1980) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Deep Seabed Hard 
Mineral Resources Act); U.S. Department of Commerce N .O.A.A. Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 970 (1983). 
On this Act, see Arrow, The Proposed Regime for the Unilateral Exploitation of Deep Seabed Mineral Resources 
by the United States, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 337 (1980); Arrow, The Alternative Seabed Mining Regime: 1981,5 
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. I (1982) [hereinafter cited as Arrow, Alternative Seabed Mining); Brown, The Impact of 
Unilateral Legislation on the Future Legal Regime of Deep-Sea Mining, 20 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 145 
(1982); Molitor, The U.S. Deep Seabed MiningRegulations: The Legal Basis for an Alternative Regime, 19 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 599 (1982). 
119. Gesetz zur vorlaufigen Regelung des Tiefseebergbaus, 16 Aug. 1980, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I 
(BGBI) 9080, No. 50 (Aug. 22, 1980) 1457, as amend8d 12 Feb. 1982, BGBI No.5 (Feb. 17, 1982) 136. 
For an English translation of this Act of Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining, and amendments, 
see 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 393 (1981) and 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 832 (1982) [hereinafter cited 
as Fed. Rep. of Germany: Act of Interim Regulations). For a comparison of this Act with the U.S. 
legislation, see Brown, supra note 118; Caron, Deep Seabed Mining: A Comparative Study of u.s. and West 
German Municipal Legislation, 5 MARINE POLICY 4 (1981). 
120. For the translation of the French Law No. 81-11350f23 December 1981 on the exploration and 
exploitation of the mineral resources of the deep seabed, see Law on the Exploration and Exploitation 
of Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed, 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 808 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 
France: Law No. 81-1135). The official French text appears in 1981 J.O. 3499-3500. 
121. Japan: Law on Interim Measures for Deep Seabed Mining, July 20, 1982, reprinted in 22 INT'L 
LEGAL MATERIALS 102 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Japan: Law). 
122. For the Soviet Union, see the translation of the Edict on Provisional Measures to Regulate Soviet 
Enterprises for the Exploration and Exploitation of Mineral Resources, in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 
551 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Soviet Union: Edict). 
123. U.K. Deep Sea Mining (Temporary Provisions) (28July 1981),20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1217 
(1981) [hereinafter cited as United Kingdom: Deep Sea Mining Act 1981). 
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have only an interim character and will be in force pending entry for the 
respective country of the Convention. In any case, exploitation cannot start 
before January 1, 1988.124 The laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States provide for special 
funds to be created from part of the proceeds received from the exploitation, to 
be transferred to the ISA for sharing with the international community.125 
These unilateral enactments, however, were condemned at UNCLOS III by the 
developing countries126 as prejudicing negotiations and in conflict with the 
Moratorium Resolution of 1969127 and the Declaration of Principles Governing 
the Seabed of 1970.128 
2. Methods of Exploiting the Seabed 
The idea of a "parallel system" of exploitation, 129 along with the principle that 
the International Seabed Authority should exercise some measure of control 
over the private and national track of the system, has been endorsed by both 
developing and industrialized nations, including the United States. What is 
controversial is the extent of the ISA's control over the access to and conditions 
of seabed exploitation by private and state contractors. Although the parallel 
124. U.S. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, supra note 118, § 102(c)(D); Fed. Rep. of 
Germany: Act of Interim Regulations, supra note 119, § 7; France: Law No. 81-1135, supra note 120; 
United Kingdom: Deep Sea Mining Act 1981, supra note 123, § 2(4); Soviet Union: Edict, supra note 
122, para. 6. Cf Japan: Law, supra note 121, art. 43. 
125. U.S. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act,supra note 118,30 U.S.C. § I, para. l(b)(2) and 
§ 103; Fed. Rep. of Germany: Act of Interim Regulations,supra note 119, § 13; United Kingdom: Deep 
Sea Mining Act 1981, supra note 120, § 10; Soviet Union: Edict, supra note 122, paras. 18 and 19. 
126. See Letter from the Chairman of the Group of 77, M. Carias (Honduras) to the President of 
UNCLOS HI, (Oct. 10, 1979) (protesting any unilateral legislation on seabed mining). U.N. Doc. 
AlCONF.62/94, reprinted in 12 UNCLOS HI Off. Rec. 112-13 (1980). See also Oxman, The Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: the Seventh Session (1978), 73 AM. J. INT'L L. I, 30-38 (1978). See 
also Arrow, Proposed Regime, supra note 118; Arrow, Alternative Seabed Mining, supra note 118; Brown, 
supra note 118; Molitor, supra note 118; Comment, Law of the Sea: Unilateral Licensing of Seabed Mining, 
23 HARY. INT'L L.J. 155 (1982); Vicuna, National Laws on Seabed Exploitation: Problems of International Law, 
13 LAW. AM. 139 (1981); Martin, Deep-Sea Mining Between Convention and National Legislation, 10 OCEAN 
DEV. INT'L L. 175 (1981); Caron, Municipal Legislation for Exploitation of the Deep Seabed, 9 OCEAN DEY. 
INT'L L. 259 (1980). The so-called "reciprocating agreement" concluded among the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, designed to make appropriate provi-
sions for avoiding overlaps in seabed mining claims, is only an interim arrangement and emphasizes 
that it is without prejudice to the decisions of its parties with respect to the UNCLOS III Convention. See 
France-Federal Republic of Germany-United Kingdom-United States: Agreement Concerning 
Interim Arrangements Relating to Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Sea Bed, done at Washington and 
entered into force September 2, 1982, reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 950 (1982). 
127. See supra note Ill. 
128. See supra note 84. 
129. Convention, supra note 2, art. 153(2) and Annex HI, art. 8. Under the parallel system of 
exploitation, all activities in the "Area" would be under the control of the ISA, which would be 
authorized to mine the seabed through an organ called "the Enterprise." See Lee, The Enterprise: 
Operational Aspects and Implications, 15 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 62 (1980). 
24 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol.vn, No.1 
exploitation system under the Convention still falls short of the developing 
countries' expectations, and is unacceptable to the United States/ 30 it neverthe-
less reflects some major concerns of the NIEO ideology, such as preferential 
treatment for developing countries,131 regulation and supervision of transna-
tional corporations,132 and promoting the transfer of technology to developing 
countries. 133 With respect to the last principle, the Convention includes provi-
sions governing the transfer of deep seabed mining technology which are among 
the reasons for the United States' refusal to sign the Convention. The Group of 
77 tied the problem of deep seabed technology transfer to the right of access to 
the Area, the result being that technologically advanced countries were forced to 
make certain concessions. Under the Convention, a mining contractor must 
undertake to make available the required technology "on fair and reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions" not only to the ISA's Enterprise but also to the 
developing country that applies for a contract to exploit a site reserved to the 
Enterprise.134 This idea was objected to by the United States.135 
The resolution of the technology transfer dilemma is crucial for any meaning-
ful participation of the developing countries in seabed mining.136 In the early 
stages of operations, it would be only the very few technologically more ad-
vanced "threshold" countries, such as Brazil, India, and Mexico, that would 
directly participate in seabed mining. The great majority of the developing 
world could take part only indirectly through involvement in the activities of the 
Enterprise and various training programs in seabed marine science and technol-
ogy.137 
130. The United States does, in principle, accept the parallel system, but believes that its present 
form discriminates in favor of the ISA. See Statement by Ambassador J.L. Malone, Special Representa-
tive oftlie President of the United States at an informal meeting, at UNCLOS Ill, August 13, 1981, at 4. 
One of the reasons why the United States did not sign the Convention was its concern that the 
Convention did not assure that qualified American applicants would receive contracts to mine. For the 
position of the United States and other U.S. concerns in this matter, see Approaches to Major Problems, 
Part XI of the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, Feb. 24, 1982, Conference paper at the 11th 
session [hereinafter cited as Approaches to Major Problems]; and Statement by Amb. Malone, supra. S •• 
also, e.g., Larson, The United Stat.s Position on the Deep Seabed, 3 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. I (1979). 
131. NIEO Declaration, supra note II, para. 4(n). 
132. ld. para. 4(g). 
133. ld. para. 4(p). 
134. Convention, supra note 2, art. 144 and Annex Ill, art. 5. 
135. The United States is against mandatory transfer of technology. In its view, technology is private 
property and not subject to governmental control. In addition, the United States believes that subscrib-
ing to a legal obligation to transfer marine technology to developing countries could serve as a 
dangerous precedent for other types of technology. B. BOCZEK, supra note 74, at 42. 
136. Two basic kinds of technology are a continuous line bucket scooping the manganese nodules 
from the seabed and a dredge device with hydraulic-suction or compressed air-lift pushing system, 
which bring the nodules through a pipe to the mining ship. See B. BOCZEK, supra note 74, at 5. 
137. Article 148 of the Convention calls for the promotion of effective participation of developing 
states in activities in the Area, but benefits from such participation would not be immediately available to 
the countries involved. Convention, supra note 2, art. 148. 
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3. Production Control 
Perhaps the clearest impact of the NIEO upon the Convention rules govern-
ing the Area is in the complex provisions dealing with quantitative limits on the 
production of seabed minerals. These limits are designed to protect developing 
land-based producer countries against overabundant world mineral supplies 
which would reduce prices and result in lower export earnings.13s Concerned 
about the availability of vital strategic minerals and the precedential impact of 
production control "cartels" which might spill over to other commodities, the 
United States strongly questions this NIEO-inspired part of the deep seabed 
provisions. 139 
Closely related to production control is the issue of the ISA's participation in 
commodity conferences and agreements. The ISA's goal through such participa-
tion would be to stabilize world markets for raw materials and commodities in 
favor of the interests of the developing countries which are producing them. 140 
In particular, there has been controversy as to whether the ISA may become a 
party to the UNCT AD-conceived Integrated Program of Commodities (lPC)141 
with respect to copper and manganese. As viewed by the ideology of economic 
liberalism, agreements of this kind are "cartelization" and disregard consumers' 
interests. 142 Under the Convention, the ISA may participate in any commodity 
conferences and agreements dealing with the commodities produced from the 
minerals derived from the Area and may implement production controls result-
ing from them. 143 The United States' concern was that the ISA might exercise 
substantial influence over activities which occurred within the United States. 
Moreover, since the agreements would be designed to protect developing coun-
tries' land-based producers, the ISA might advocate controls which discrimi-
nated against seabed mining in favor of land-based mining. 144 
138. !d., arts. 150(g), 151(4). Cj. Declaration of Principles, supra note 84, Preamble; NIEO Declara-
tion, supra note 11, para. 4(j); and Programme of Action, supra note 13, para. I(d). For further 
discussion see Juda, supra note 46, at 237-43; Ogley, supra note 46, at 245-46; Post, United Nations 
Involvement in Ocean Mining, in ASPEKTE DER SEERECHTSENTWICKLUNG, 194, 194-200 (W. Vitzthum ed. 
1980). 
139. At the 11th UNCLOS III session the United States proposed to raise or abolish the quantitative 
limitations or link them to a steep and long drop of land-based metals. U.S. Is Returning to Sea Treaty 
Talks, N.Y. Times, March 5, 1982, at 3, col. I. 
140. Programme of Action, supra note 13, para. 5(I)(I)(c); Charter, supra note 17, art. 5. 
141. See Juda, supra note 46, at 237-38; Ogley, supra note 46, at 247-4~. The IPC is an UNCTAD-
sponsored program designed to protect the developing countries from the adverse effect of fluctuation 
of prices of their exports. See UNCT AD, Draft Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for 
Commodities, 5 June 1980, U.N. Doc. TD/IPClCONF/L.15, reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 896 
(1980). 
142. See generally Juda, supra note 46, at 237-38. 
143. Convention, supra note 2, art. 151, para. I(a), (b). 
144. Approaches to Major Problems, supra note 130, at 31. 
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4. Political Control 
As a political ideology, the NIEO espouses a restructuring of international 
institutions and decision-making processes on the basis of the "sovereign equal-
ity" of states and "full and equal" participation of the developing countries. 145 In 
this sense, the very creation of an "International Sea-Bed Authority" by means of 
negotiations with the full participation of the developing states is already an 
achievement for the NIEo. 
The NIEO model of an international body governed by the one-state, one-vote 
rule and endowed with decision-making power in all important matters, or at 
least sharing that power with a subordinate council whose composition it would 
be free to determine, could not materialize in the face of strong opposition from 
the industrialized countries. The protracted bargaining over the "hard-core" 
issue of the powers, composition, and voting procedure of the ISA's executive 
organ, the Council, is well known and need not be described here in detail. 146 
One thing, however, is already clear: the powers and the decision-making system 
in the ISA will depart in significant respects from its NIEO modeI.I47 The 
composition, powers, and voting system of the Council are the result of a 
compromise between the Group of 77 and the Western industrialized ·countries 
which has already succeeded in blunting the edge of the NIEO ideology. First, 
the most important substantive decisions, such as those concerning access to the 
seabed, cannot be made without the Council's consent.148 Second, despite provi-
sions allocating seats to various categories of developing states,149 only half of the 
145. NIEO Declaration, supra note II, para. 4(a), (c); Charter, supra note 17, art. 10. Because the 
developing countries represent a majority in global international organizations, they obviously wanted 
to bestow upon the one-member, one-vote ISA, as much crucial decision-making power as possible. On 
the other hand, the industrialized countries wanted to shift that power to the thirty-six member Council, 
Charter, supra note 17, art. 161, in which they would be adequately represented and would counter-
balance the Asse~bly. The result was an uneasy compromise reluctantly accepted by the Group of 77 
and rejected by the United States. 
146. See, e.g., Sreenivasa Rao, Structure and Puwers of the International Seabed Authority, in LAW OF THE 
SEA: CARACAS AND BEVOND 277 (R. Anand ed. 1978); Adede, The Group of 77 and the Establishmmt of the 
International Sea-Bed Authority, 7 OcEAN DEV. INT'L L. 31 (1979); Richardson, Decision-Making in the 
International Seabed Authority, 5 MARINE POLlCV 256 (1981); Borgese, The Role of the International Seabed 
Authority in the 1980's, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 395 (1981). 
147. This point is stressed in agley, supra note 46, at 248. 
148. Convention, supra note 2, art. 162. 
149. Among the thirty-six members of the Council to be elected for four years by the Assembly are 
"four members from among States Parties which on the basis of production in areas under their 
jurisdiction are major net exporters of the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, including 
at least two developing States whose exports of such minerals have a substantial bearing upon their 
economies." Convention,supra note 2, art. 161, para. l(c); "six members from among developing States 
Parties, representing special interests. The special interests to be represented shall include those of the 
States with large populations, States which are land-locked or geographically disadvantaged, States 
which are major importers of the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, States which are 
potential producers of such minerals and least developed States." Id., art. 161, para. l(d). 
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thirty-six members of the Council are to be elected according to the "equitable 
geographical distribution" criteria. 150 Furthermore, the interests of seabed min-
ing states and their nationals l51 and major consumer and importing nations are 
also represented on the Council. 152 Third, the complex four-tier structure of 
voting in the CounciP53 provides for a simple majority only in procedural 
matters. In substantive matters, however, the voting system requires two-third, 
three-quarters, and "consensus" voting, according to the degree of importance. 
"Consensus," defined as the "absence of any formal objection,"154 would apply to 
such matters as measures to protect land-based producers, recommendations of 
rules on the equitable sharing of benefits derived from seabed mining, and 
adoption of amendments to Part XI (the Area).155 This uneasy consensus com-
promise, amounting to a virtual veto formula, is the very opposite of ma-
joritarianism, which is the preferred voting system according to the ideas of the 
NIEO. Nor did it prove satisfactory to the United States, which believes that the 
consensus voting system could be used to block decisions necessary for the 
efficient operation of the mining regime. 156 Despite provisions on conciliation 
designed to mitigate any possible veto in the CounciJ,157 the chances of a dead-
lock are strong. This means that some of the most important substantive issues 
may not be settled in the Convention but will have to be resolved in difficult 
negotiations after its entry into force. 
This survey of the emerging international law governing the seabed and its 
resources demonstrates the strong influence of the NIEO ideology. The task of 
150. Eighteen members of the Council are elected "according to the principle of ensuring an 
equitable geographical distribution of seats in the Council as a whole, provided that each geographical 
region shall have at least one member elected under this subparagraph. For this purpose, the geograph-
ical regions shall be Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe (Socialist), Latin America and Western Europe and 
Others." [d., art. 161, para. l(e). 
151. Four members of the Council are to be elected from among the eight states "which have the 
largest investments in preparation for and in the conduct of activities in the Area, either directly or 
through their nationals, including at least one State from the Eastern European (Socialist) region. [d., 
art. 161, para. I(b). 
152. Four members of the Council are to be elected from among those states which "during the last 
five years for which statistics are available, have either consumed more than two per cent of total world 
consumption or have had net imports of more than two per cent of total world imports of the 
commodities produced from the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, and in any case one 
State from the Eastern European (Socialist) region, as well as the largest consumer." [d., art. 161, para. 
I(a). The "largest consumer" clause was added at the 11th Session in April 1982 to meet the concern of 
the United States, now such a consumer, to ensure it a guaranteed seat. United Nations Press Release 
SEAlI954, 22 (April 30, 1982). This concession by the Group of 77 did not satisfy the United States, 
however, which considers it to be fundamentally important that other highly industrialized western 
countries be guaranteed seats in the Council. See Approaches to Major Problems, supra note 130, at 5. 
153. Convention, supra note 2, art. 161(8). 
154. [d., art. 161(8)(e). 
155. !d., art. 161(8)(d). 
156. Approaches to Major Problems, supra note 130, at 6. 
157. Convention, supra note 2, art. 161(7)(e). 
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progressively developing international legal institutions and concepts in the law 
of the sea has been stimulated by the ideas of the NIEO. Yet despite the obvious 
links between the NIEO and the proposed legal regime of the deep seabed, it is 
also clear that the NIEO principles have not been and cannot be fully im-
plemented when the perceived interests and needs of the two major groups of 
unions are antagonistic. Any realistic response to this challenge must be based on 
compromises acceptable to both sides. Unfortunately, this compromise has not 
yet been obtained. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The major challenges to the law of the sea today are linked to the reaction of 
the developing countries to selected institutions and rules of traditional interna-
tiona I law which the developing countries consider to be inequitable and biased 
in favor of the developed world. Hence, the challenges to the law of the sea have 
become part and parcel of the overall North-South conflict and the Third World 
campaign to restructure the international system according to the NIEO ideol-
ogy. The principles of the NIEO are articulated in resolutions of the United 
Nations General Assembly of 1974. These resolutions are only political and 
moral declarations concerned with the ideological strategy of the developing 
countries and which, at least in the Western view, do not provide a firm legal 
basis for a new law of the sea. 
The first of the challenges to the law of the sea, launched even before the 
official promulgation of the NIEO principles, was directed against the traditional 
and allegedly "outlived" principle of the freedom of the seas. This principle is 
perceived by the Third World as a tool of neocolonialism in the hands of the 
technologically advanced countries of the North. Although extension of coastal 
jurisdiction and the eventual emergence of the Exclusive Economic Zone benefit 
only a small number of select developing countries, and on total balance favor 
the developed world, this system nevertheless has been endorsed by the Group 
of 77 as more equitable than a system governed by traditional international legal 
principles. As a result, it was "legitimized" in the Convention. The institution of 
the EEZ was skillfully elevated by leading coastal state members of the Group, 
against the belated better judgment of poor landlocked and geographically 
disadvantaged states, to the status of a pillar of a new law of the sea. The 
extension of coastal jurisdiction was just as much a result of nationalism as it was 
a result of the internationalist ideology of the NIEO, whose rhetoric really only 
served to cloak national self-interest. National interests, determined primarily by 
geography, have also been the major determinant in the evolution of the exten-
sion of the coastal states' jurisdiction to large areas of the continental margin, 
which was also endorsed in the Convention of 1982. 
The proliferation of all kinds of claims to extended coastal jurisdiction creates 
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potential dangers and challenges to international rule of law. The multiplicity of 
overlapping and increasing tensions and conflicting claims based upon diverse 
and unclear legal grounds is bound to result in disputes, increasing tensions, and 
threats to international peace. Conflicts are also likely to erupt if coastal develop-
ing countries apply discriminatory administrative measures to foreign vessels in 
their EEZ or exclude foreign research activities there. Although freedom of 
navigation in the EEZ seems to be guaranteed, a coastal state may nevertheless 
question the right to such freedom of foreign naval ships in its zone. 158 There 
exists a danger that some developing coastal states may be tempted to expand the 
scope of their sovereign rights in a legally unprecedented marine environment 
of an "almost full" sovereignty over the EEZ. In short, the danger is that the EEZ 
may de facto, or even de jure, be assimilated in a territorial sea. The extravagant 
claims of "territorialist" states in Latin America and Africa to a territorial sea 
beyond twelve miles, and up to 200 miles, are perhaps an indication of a 
dangerous trend in the law of the sea. Whether the twelve mile rule adopted at 
UNCLOS 111159 will deter attempts to convert economic zones into territorial 
seas remains to be seen.160 
One paradoxical result of the extension of coastal jurisdiction has been that, 
instead of contributing to a more equitable distribution of the planet'S resources 
and wealth in accordance with the ideology of the NIEO with which it is 
associated, it has actually compounded the existing inequities and perhaps even 
contributed to creating new classes of haves and have-nots among the Third 
World countries. The meager provisions of the 1982 Convention regarding EEZ 
surplus sharing and payments to the ISA from the continental margin beyond 
200 miles are not an adequate response to the challenge of inequitable access to 
ocean resources. Realistically speaking, what could today be equitably shared has 
been "nationalized" and what is to be shared of the otherwise reduced "common 
heritage" remains a matter of rather remote and doubtful future. The danger is 
that after the treaty goes into effect, the least developed and disadvantaged 
states, being dissatisfied with the lack of adequate compensatory mechanisms, 
may again raise the issue of a satisfactory adjustment of their claims in the name 
of a more equitable international economic order. 
The other major challenge in the law of the sea today is the need to agree on 
an international regime governing the "common heritage of mankind," that is, 
158. At UNCLOS Ill, developing countries repeatedly raised the issue of the need to restrict such 
freedom. A. HOLLICK, supra note 52, at 337. Legislation enabling the government to order restrictions 
on navigation of foreign shipping in the EEZ exists in at least four countries including India, Pakistan. 
Mauretania. and Guyana. See Smith, Trends in National Marine Claims. 32 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 216 (1980). 
159. Convention, supra note 2. art. 3. 
160. It is optimistically claimed by some that UNCLOS III has had a positive influence on national 
behavior because it has driven most states toward the EEZ or fisheries zone approach rather than the 
"territorialist" claims. See. e.g .• Camimos. Aspects of NIEO in the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea: 
Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATiONAL Eco-
NOMIC ORDER 189. 192 (K. Hossain ed. 1980). 
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the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. It is this issue that has become the 
symbol of the ideological North-South split and the reason for the failure to 
secure, thus far, the United States' participation in the 1982 Convention on the 
Law of the Sea. Even now, however, it is reasonable to conclude that the NIEO 
ideology has made an impact on the international law of the sea governing the 
exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed. The NIEO ideological imprint 
is clearly seen in the very idea of the "common heritage," the production controls 
in the interests of developing countries, and the creation of the International 
Seabed Authority, a unique international organization with powers to regulate 
activities in the international "Area." Yet, as discussed above, the NIEO princi-
ples cannot be fully applied in this novel field of the law of the sea. A compro-
mise between the vested interests of the industrialized nations, which sig-
nificantly include not only the laissez-faire Western democracies but also the 
centrally-planned "socialist" Soviet Union, and the developing world is neces-
sary to create a viable deep seabed regime. 
Finally, although the NIEO ideology has precipitated profound changes in the 
law of the sea, it has not significantly contributed to the realization of a more 
equitable international economic order. There is a dilemma between the interna-
tionalist claims of developing countries for equity in the law of the sea and their 
continued and even stronger insistence on national sovereignty and indepen-
dence. How to solve this dilemma remains the fundamental problem not only of 
the law of the sea, but also of international law in general. 
